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Background: Donor funding for HIV programs has flattened out in recent years, which limits the ability of HIV
programs worldwide to achieve universal access and sustain current progress. This study examines alternative
mechanisms for resource mobilization.
Methods: Potential non-donor funding sources for national HIV responses in low- and middle-income countries
were explored through literature review and Global Fund documentation, including data from 17 countries. We
identified the source, financing agent, magnitude of resources, frequency of availability, as well as enabling and risk
factors.
Results: Four non-donor funding sources for HIV programs were identified: earmarked levy for HIV from country
budgets; risk-pooling schemes such as health insurance; debt conversion, in which the creditor country reduces the
debt of the debtor country and allocates at least a part of that reduction to health; and concessionary loans from
international development banks, which unlike grants, must be repaid. The first two are recurring sources of funding,
while the latter two are usually one-time sources, and, if very large, might negatively affect the debtor country’s
economy. Insurance schemes in five African countries covered less than 6.1% of the HIV expenditure, while social
health insurance in four Latin American countries covered 8–11% of the HIV expenditure; in Colombia and Chile, it
covered 69% and 60%, respectively. Most low-income countries will find concessionary loans hard to repay, as their
HIV programs cost 0.5–4% of GDP. Even in a middle-income country like India, a US$255 million concessionary loan
to be repaid over 25 years provided only 7.8% of a 5-year HIV budget. Earmarked levies provided only 15% of the
annual HIV funding needs in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Debt conversion provided the same share in Indonesia, but in
Pakistan it was much higher - the equivalent of 45% of the annual cost of the national HIV program.
Conclusions: Domestic sources of funding are important alternatives to consider and might be able to replace
donor HIV funding in specific country contexts, coupled with effective prioritization and efficiency measures.
Successful resource mobilization design and implementation require close collaboration with other sectors,
particularly with the Ministry of Finance, to make sure that the new financing mechanism is fully synchronized
with economic growth and that HIV investments yield returns in the form of higher social benefits.Background
In a vast majority of low- and middle-income countries,
national health systems face financial sustainability chal-
lenges as donor funding declines. Donor dependence is
particularly high for HIV programs in low- and middle-
income countries where HIV prevalence is high. Com-
bined donor assistance to HIV programs in 127 of these
countries amounted to 49% of total HIV funding in 2011.* Correspondence: katz@cantab.net
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unless otherwise stated.In many low-income countries, and in some middle-
income ones, the dependence is higher: in Cambodia,
Niger, and Tajikistan, for example, more than 75% of
HIV spending comes from outside agencies, with the
government contributing less than 25% [1]. HIV programs
tend to rely more on donor funding than does the wider
health sector. In lower middle-income Ukraine in 2009,
donor funding as a percentage of total health expenditure
was only 0.3%, whereas it accounted for 46% of the fund-
ing for the national HIV program [2]. In upper middle-
income Jamaica in 2008, donor assistance to the health. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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the country’s HIV program [3].
HIV has long-term implications for treatment costs
because it is a chronic condition that requires medical
attention throughout the life of the patient. In addition,
as an infectious disease, it requires sustained resources
for prevention. To execute the investment framework
led by UNAIDS, a global HIV strategy budgeted at be-
tween US$16 billion and US$22 billion will be required
annually between 2011 and 2020 to effectively fight the
AIDS epidemic [4]; in 2011, US$16.8 billion was avail-
able globally [1]. After rapidly expanding, HIV funding
from donor countries has flattened out between 2008
and 2012, ranging between US$6.9 and US$7.9 billion
per year [5]. The recent global recession, coupled with
increasing competing demands for new causes such as
non-communicable diseases, climate change, and the en-
vironment, might further jeopardize increased donor
funding for HIV. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria, PEPFAR, and other donors have
already begun to consolidate and focus their funding on
certain priorities and are demanding greater counterpart
participation. A key goal of the five-year PEPFAR
reauthorization in 2008 has been to transition from
emergency response to country-led sustainable HIV pro-
grams [6]. To boost country contributions by recipient
governments, in 2011 the Global Fund issued eligibility
and counterpart financing guidelines, requiring countries
to match the grant funds with a contribution based on
their income level [7]. For example, low-income coun-
tries are required to match only 5% of their Global Fund
financing, while upper middle-income countries are re-
quired to match 60%. In parallel, a number of countries
receiving donor assistance for their HIV programs have
graduated in recent years to upper or lower middle-
income groups as a result of the economic growth, enab-
ling them to increase their share in funding of their HIV
response. Seventeen of them are now ineligible for Glo-
bal Fund financing.
The above trends require policymakers of national
health sectors to expand their fiscal space to address the
financial sustainability of the HIV programs as their
donor funding is set to decline. A long-term financial
sustainability plan should include cost reduction, im-
proved allocation of funding (both of tax money and
within health programs), and resource mobilization
[8-13]. The remainder of this paper describes accessing
and/or creating alternative resources to donor funding,
alternatives that can be proposed by policymakers of
health programs.
Methods
The paper reviews resource mobilization alternatives that
have been deployed or are being considered by nationalHIV programs in low- and middle-income countries (in-
cluding countries such as Chile and Uruguay, which re-
cently became high income). The alternative financing
mechanisms presented here derive from consultation with
health financing experts and review of both academic and
grey literature. In addition to literature known to the au-
thors, a search in PubMed and Google Scholar was con-
ducted, including using various combinations of HIV and/
or AIDS with funding, tax, levy, earmarked, concessionary,
loans, deb conversation, Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Pro-
gram (MAP), risk-pooling, insurance, social health insur-
ance, and resource mobilization. The criteria for inclusion
were as follows:
1. Funding mechanisms that policymakers of health
programs are usually in a position to promote. We
did not include options such as improving tax
revenue administration and printing money. While
those will expand the fiscal space, they might or
might not be directed to the health sector.
2. Funding mechanisms that channel the funds to the
country executing the mechanism. As such, we
excluded global initiatives such as UNITAID, a
global health initiative financed mainly by a
solidarity levy on airline tickets, and the
International Finance Facility (IFF), which issues
bonds on global capital markets against the security
of government guarantees. This increases funding
for global health in the short term [14].
3. Funding mechanisms that have been examined by
HIV programs in low- and middle-income countries.
This criterion eliminated options such as borrowing
money in general financial markets (where interest
rates tend to be high) and social impact bonds,
where the government contracts out provision of
social services to a private sector company that is
paid based on its reaching pre-defined targets, with
no upfront payment [15].
4. Options that do not require substantial support
from additional resources to cover the antiretroviral
treatment (ART) cost, such as community-based
health financing, which similar to health insurance
provides health coverage, yet the funding generated
is sufficient only for basic health services, not for
HIV-related biomedical services.
Per funding source, we provide a brief explanation on
the nature of the funding source, the financing agent
[16], whether it is a recurring funding source or one-off,
enabling and risk factors, and magnitude and/or feasibi-
lity of resources it mobilizes. We provide country exam-
ples on the extent to which a funding source covers the
annual cost of the HIV response, the latter taken from
funding requests made by the countries to the Global
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of the four strategies identified. This is followed by a




Earmarked taxes seek to increase government funds
available for HIV and/or health more broadly by increas-
ing tax revenue. A number of countries have introduced
special taxes that are earmarked (i.e., exclusively allo-
cated) for health interventions, for example, on air traffic
and tobacco products [17].
Earmarked taxes have several pros and cons (Table 2)
[18,19]. The pros include a greater willingness of
taxpayers to pay a tax with associated positive health
benefits [20] and the ability to protect the funded
program/s from general budgetary cutbacks and/or de-
prioritization. Cons include loss of control over total ex-
penditure, in particular when priorities of a country
change. Earmarked taxes, where mismanaged, may lead
to inefficiencies and misuse of funds.
If this strategy is to be pursued, designers must con-
sider several issues when determining the item to tax
and the amount of tax, including: its potential to gener-
ate sufficient revenues, the reduction in revenue if it
causes a decrease in demand for the taxed good/service,
the ease of implementation – for example, straightfor-
ward collection processes with low administrative (oper-
ating) costs – and the likelihood the tax will affect
businesses. The ability to implement such tax depends






















































fincan be expected that the tax share will be at least 15% of
the GDP. In countries such as Tanzania, where the tax
ratio is less than 13%, increasing the fiscal space is pos-
sible, yet where ratio already exceeds this rate, as in
Zambia and Malawi, adding a new tax might be difficult
[9]. Political will and consensus among the government
and lawmakers is important in implementing special levy
schemes. Finally, reliance on social security may limit
the acceptability to the public of yet another employ-
ment tax to cover the costs of HIV services. Reliance on
social security is common in most countries in Latin
America.
Zimbabwe introduced an AIDS levy in 1998, and it be-
came operational in January 2000, when a 3% earmarked
(or special purpose) tax was imposed on employers and
workers. Funds collected from this tax are channeled to
the National AIDS Trust Fund. In 2011, the government
collected US$26 million through the trust fund – a
figure that is expected to rise to US$30 million in 2012
[21]. This funding source is substantial, yet still insuf-
ficient – the average annual funding requested from the
Global Fund by Zimbabwe for 2014–2016 was US$195
million, more than six times the expected revenue from
this tax in 2012. Nevertheless, this method has worked
in this low-income country, where other innovative
financing mechanisms described in this paper are harder
to implement. As a tax on employment, this special
earmarked tax for HIV increases the cost of labor and
may inhibit formal employment. However, the obvious
benefit of this tax is that it has collected a substantial
amount of revenue that, if managed well, is put to good
social use.ing of HIV programs
ples of magnitude/feasibility
babwe – 15% of the requested annual funding from the Global
d for 2014–2016.
ya – 15% of the estimated cost of the 2012/13 national HIV response.
ia – A US$255 million concessionary loan to this middle-income
ntry provides 7.8% of the 5-year HIV budget and is to be repaid over
years.
middle-income countries – Most will find concessionary loans hard to
ay, as their HIV programs cost 0.5-4% of GDP.
onesia – Debt conversion mobilized US$35.5 million for health
grams, the equivalent of 15% of the funding needed for the national
response of US$241 million.
istan – Debt conversion was the equivalent of 45% of the annual cost of
HIV program. However, HIV prevalence in Pakistan is very low (<0.1%),
with it the required financial resources.
cial health insurance (SHI) schemes provide 60% of the HIV funding
Chile, and 69% in Colombia; the proportion is substantially lower in
following: El Salvador 10%, Paraguay 11%, Peru 9%, and Uruguay 8%.
ya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia – Private insurance
ess than 6.1% of the national HIV expenditure.
anda – In this low-income country, a health insurance scheme was































































Share of cost of the National HIV response 
Figure 1 Magnitude of strategies that countries are using to finance HIV programs. The examples of risk-pooling schemes from Africa include
HIV expenditures of both private firms and private health insurance, and as such the share of health insurance alone is lower.
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Loans for health and HIV programs with favorable terms,
such as low interest rates and deferred payment schedules,
are available for eligible countries from sources such as
the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and re-
gional development banks, and other financing institu-
tions. While a loan is required to be repaid, unlike a grant,
its selection and implementation mechanism focuses on
the efficient use of the funds, inclusive of project finance
supervision. A number of low- and middle-income coun-
tries use World Bank loans and grants to support their
health sector programs. Many of them also used World
Bank funds for implementing HIV projects in the last dec-
ade. In the African region alone, between 2001 and 2011,
the World Bank provided US$2 billion to an estimated 50Table 2 Earmarked tax: pros and cons
For Again
• Households associate the benefits of the government expenditure
with the tax paid and are more prepared to pay.
• Earmarking may provide a more consistent source of funds for
expenditures that yield high benefits but may not be high on
the political agenda, such as road maintenance.
• Earmarking shields expenditures from the uncertainties of















Sources: [18,19].countries and regional entities for HIV projects. Angola,
Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Swaziland,
and Tanzania are but a few that did so [22]. The World
Bank has greatly scaled back such funding in recent years
as both the Global Fund and PEPFAR started offering
large-scale grants [23,24], though there are still HIV pro-
grams being financed through it: in June 2013, India’s HIV
national response received US$255 million in a loan with
no interest, and ability to repay over a period of 25 years
[25]. This represents 7.8% of the 5-year HIV budget [26].
In addition to loans from development banks, gov-
ernments can pursue ODA loans, which have a grant
element of at least 25% because of their low-interest
and/or long-term payment schedules. These bilateral
agreements between governments focus on program-st
arking means a loss of control over total expenditure.
arking circumvents the budgetary process and review and may distort
misallocate funds.
ts to earmarked revenues become entrenched with funding no longer
d on agreed priorities.
transparency may lead to inefficiencies and
se of funds.
arking can facilitate attempts to create monopolies and abuse of
opoly power.
arking could lead to cutbacks (or expansion) of services wholly unrelated
ed.
arking leads to less flexibility at the margin to reallocate funds when
udget is under stress.
arking is incompatible with good cash management.
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donor country. Japan and France are two countries that fre-
quently give loans in a larger proportion than grants, pro-
viding US$7.5 billion and US$1.4 billion, respectively, in
loans for a wide range of development projects in 2010
[27]. However, because of the availability of donor funding,
concessionary loans for HIV are limited to date. This might
change if demand from countries for such loans increases.
Low-interest loans issued by international development
agencies typically have conditions that the host country
does not like or cannot fulfill. Thus, securing such loans
might involve a lengthy negotiation process between the
recipient country and the lender. Repaying the loan may
become difficult if the local currency depreciates against
the currency in which the loan needs to be repaid, and/or
if government tax revenue declines. Loans will be hard to
repay in most low-income countries, where costs of HIV
programs are 0.5–4% of GDP, substantial given that public
health expenditures among African low-income countries
averages only about 2.5% of GDP, and domestic govern-
ment revenues are frequently below 15% of GDP [28]. But
if the HIV project financed by the loan is well conceived
and managed, it should yield returns in the form of higher
social benefits (e.g., reduced incidence of HIV, reduced
mortality and morbidity, lower work absenteeism, higher
productivity); these may also translate into higher eco-
nomic output and tax revenue in the longer term. Thus,
the focus should be on the appropriate design and imple-
mentation of the activities to be financed through the loan.
Debt conversion
Debt conversion for social investments began in 1996
with the launch of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative that linked debt relief and poverty re-
duction. A prominent example targeting HIV, tubercu-
losis, and malaria programs is the Global Fund’s
Debt2Health program, announced in 2007, which chan-
nels resources of developing countries with high debt
and disease burdens away from debt repayments and to-
ward investments in health [29].
Under Debt2Health, the Global Fund works with its
partners to identify debt conversion opportunities, and
then negotiates a three-party agreement between the bi-
lateral or multilateral creditor, the debtor, and the Global
Fund. According to the agreement, creditors forgo a por-
tion of their claims on the condition that the beneficiary
country (the debtor) invests an agreed counterpart
amount in its national HIV, tuberculosis, and/or malaria
programs, through an approved Global Fund grant. The
funding provided through Debt2Health is disbursed by
the Global Fund to the beneficiary country through the
fund’s normal performance-based grant mechanism.
As of May 2013, four Debt2Health agreements plus
one framework agreement have been signed. Germanyand Australia are the creditor countries and Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Côte d’Ivoire are the contracting benefi-
ciaries. A total of €163.6 million has been committed to
these Debt2Health agreements, with half of this
amount – €81.8 million – paid to the Global Fund for
investment in the beneficiary countries through the stand-
ard Global Fund processes and systems, and the other half
unconditionally written off by the creditor countries.
Australia used the mechanism to execute a debt swap
in Indonesia in 2010, canceling US$75 million of debt,
with Indonesia investing US$35.5 million into health
programs in the country. While a substantial amount, it
provides only 15% of the average annual funding needed
for the national HIV response of US$241 million from
2013 to 2015 [30,31]. An agreement between Germany
and Pakistan was signed in 2008, in which Germany
cancelled €40 million and Pakistan began to invest €20
million in Global Fund-approved programs in the country.
This amount translates into 45% of the annual cost of the
HIV program in Pakistan between 2013 and 2015 (thought
the Debt2Health funding could be used for fighting malaria
and/or tuberculosis, the latter being a larger health issue in
Pakistan compared to HIV and malaria). This is because,
with an HIV prevalence of less than 0.1%, the cost of the
HIV response in Pakistan is much lower than in many
countries with generalized HIV epidemics [31,32].
In addition to debt reduction and channeling public in-
vestment into social sectors, Debt2Health results in for-
eign exchange savings because the investments are in the
local currency. Challenges include transaction costs be-
cause debt conversions can be complex to negotiate, exe-
cute, and monitor. Also, the amount to be paid to the
Global Fund by the debtor country is usually due sooner
than the original debt repayment, and the local Treasury
may not have funds available to pay the Global Fund. Fi-
nally, the increased government spending could be infla-
tionary [33]. Those challenges can be mitigated with solid
planning and implementation of the debt conversion.
Risk-pooling schemes and special social assistance programs
Health insurance is an organizational arrangement devised
to offer financial protection to a large group of individuals
(known as the risk pool) from the costs associated with
preventing and treating ill health. Health insurance is
based on the principle that the financial risk of a few indi-
viduals is spread among a large pool of mostly healthy in-
dividuals. If all contribute a periodic insurance premium,
the insurer can collect and manage the premium revenue
to finance the treatment costs of the few who become sick.
In the absence of health insurance, people needing med-
ical services, especially those struck by catastrophic condi-
tions such as cancer, HIV, obstetrical emergency, or severe
accidents would find it difficult or impossible to obtain
the resources necessary to cover the cost of treatment
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adult patients hospitalized in a public referral hospital, in-
surance coverage was associated with decreased in-
hospital mortality [35].
Among private voluntary health insurance plans, sev-
eral corporations fund HIV services for their employees
and dependents and some of the private health insur-
ance companies have begun to offer coverage for HIV
services [36,37]. However, given the high cost of HIV
services, in particular of ART, which is taken for life,
many of the public and private health insurance pro-
grams still do not cover HIV services altogether or are
ambiguous regarding the coverage of these services. For
example, Kenya’s National Hospital Insurance Fund does
not cover outpatient services, including ART or outpatient
treatment of opportunistic infection. Hospitals and other
providers in Kenya must recover these costs from patients,
government, and donors [38]. The limited use of health
insurance for HIV-related services is shown in a recent re-
view of health insurance plans in five African countries –
Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia – where
private insurance covered less than 6.1% of the national
HIV expenditure [39].
Several efforts in Africa to include HIV services in
health insurance plans were supported by donor fund-
ing. There are two interesting experiences, which differ
in terms of national income level and structure of the
services. In Rwanda, a low-income country, the Global
Fund provided support to enhance financial access to
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria health-related services
by subsidizing health insurance for the very poor. The
strong leadership of the Ministry of Health enabled this
Global Fund-funded project to dramatically improve the
financial access of its target group, reaching approxi-
mately one Rwandan in six. Improved financial access
went hand-in-hand with increasing health service
utilization and improvements in the population’s health
status, including better control of the three diseases [40].
A different experience occurred in Namibia, a lower
middle-income country in sub-Saharan Africa. Namibia
received an influx of donor funding between 2004 and
2007 to support publicly provided HIV care and treat-
ment. This raised concerns that private funding would
be “crowded out,” thereby leading to a reduction in the
overall resources used to treat patients. In 2006, the
Namibian medical aid industry, with donor support, cre-
ated a special fund to subsidize private health insurance,
including HIV services. The program allowed both low-
and higher-income people to be covered. Crowding out
valuable private resources was avoided and the quality of
HIV services improved [41].
Social health insurance (SHI) schemes are based on
mandatory enrollment, which maximizes risk pooling
and guards against adverse selection. Several of thoseprograms provide full coverage for HIV and operate suc-
cessfully in upper middle-income and high-income
countries. In countries with low HIV prevalence, a large
enough portion of the population has formal employ-
ment and can therefore contribute payroll-based pre-
miums. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay have such systems. Based
on UNGASS data from 2010, 2012, and 2013, those
schemes provide 60% of the HIV funding Chile (high-in-
come), and 69% in Colombia (upper middle-income),
but the proportion is substantially lower in El Salvador
and Paraguay (both lower middle-income), Peru (upper
middle-income), and Uruguay (high-income), where
those schemes cover 8% to 11% of the national HIV
funding.
Chile’s AUGE health reform, enacted in 2005, man-
dates public and private health insurers to cover treat-
ment for 69 priority health problems, including HIV.
Even when the HIV prevalence is low and a large num-
ber of people are enrolled in the scheme, additional
funding beyond the premiums might be required, as is
the case in Brazil’s Sistema Unico de Saûde, which fully
covers HIV prevention and treatment, and is financed by
a combination of payroll and general tax revenues.
Another type of risk-pooling scheme is special social
assistance programs to benefit people living with a par-
ticular illness, including HIV. For instance, in Jamaica,
the government operates two individual drug benefit
programs under the National Health Fund (NHF) that
cover citizens for a number of chronic illnesses and con-
ditions including arthritis, diabetes, hypertension, vascu-
lar disease, and high cholesterol. Members enrolled in
these programs are eligible to receive 300 subsidized
drugs from private and public pharmacies, which, in
turn, are reimbursed by the NHF. Members are not re-
quired to pay a premium, but they do need to make the
appropriate copayments. NHF is financed from partial
allocations from the special consumption tax revenues.
Lately, the NHF drug benefit programs are being used as
a mechanism through which people living with HIV can
access free antiretroviral drugs [42].
If well designed and implemented, health insurance can
prevent catastrophic health expenditures and, conse-
quently, impoverishment. Health insurance can encourage
prevention, early diagnosis, and treatment by removing
the financial barriers to access these services. As shown
above, in several middle- or upper middle-income coun-
tries, health insurance schemes are able to cover HIV
services, at least partially. In many low- and middle-
income countries, however, public and private health in-
surance is underdeveloped. There are two major reasons
for this. First, in many of those countries a large share
of the labor force is informal, which makes mandatory
enrollment and premium collection difficult. Second,
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able to regulate health insurance to avoid the typical
problems of insurance such as adverse selection, benefi-
ciary exclusion by the insurer, cost escalation, misinfor-
mation, and deficient quality of care.
Kenya case study
Decreasing donor dependence is a challenge as reflected
in Kenya, where several options for replacing the dimin-
ishing donor HIV funding were laid out in 2009, including
two of the above options discussed above: establishing a
small levy on airline traffic (with negligible impact on
air travel); increasing the government’s budget alloca-
tion to health to 15% in order to achieve the Abuja tar-
gets (assuming the percentage of the health budget
allocated to HIV remains constant); and modestly rais-
ing premiums in the National Hospital Insurance Fund
to generate sufficient financing for the scheme to cover
essential HIV services. If all three financing options
were to be implemented, the HIV donor funding de-
pendency would decrease from 87% to 68%, still a very
high dependence on donor funding. Getting those op-
tions approved is a challenge on its own, though in
2012, after three years of lengthy negotiations with the
Ministry of Finance, the Cabinet approved the Bill entitled
Additional and Sustainable Financing for HIV/AIDS and
Non-Communicable Diseases in Kenya [8]. The govern-
ment of Kenya planned to earmark 1 per cent of its rev-
enue to a national HIV trust fund, which on its own
covers 74% of the AIDS financing gap in the ten years up
to 2020.
Discussion and conclusion
Four non-donor-based funding sources for HIV programs
were identified: earmarked levies for HIV; concessionary
loans; debt conversion; and risk-pooling schemes. Three
of them are domestic and one is external (debt conver-
sion). In three, the funding agent is the Ministry of Fi-
nance; the fourth uses health insurance entities. In both
Kenya and Zimbabwe, earmarked levies for HIV would
generate or have generated, respectively, only 15% of the
annual HIV response cost; in Indonesia, debt conversation
was also only 15% of the estimated cost of the HIV re-
sponse. While the €20 million debt conversion in Pakistan
represents 45% of the annual cost of Pakistan’s response to
its low-level HIV epidemic, this sum would have covered
a smaller share of the cost of HIV responses in more gen-
eralized epidemics. In addition, debt conversion is a one-
off mechanism rather than an ongoing funding source.
Likewise, concessionary loans are not a recurring source
of funding, they require a payment that low-income coun-
tries might find hard to cover, and they may not produce
the large amount of funding required to fight HIV. Given
the high-cost of HIV-related services, in particular of ART,the applicability of health insurance, which is solely sup-
ported by individual contributions, is influenced by a
range of factors, including the income level of the country,
the severity of the HIV epidemic, the proportion of the
labor force from which premiums can be collected, and
the ability of the country to regulate health insurance.
Understandably, we are not aware of every low- and
middle-income country that uses the funding mecha-
nisms mentioned here. Furthermore, some dimensions
such as transaction costs and social acceptability were
not compared due to lack of data. When explaining the
magnitude of some of the mechanisms, we used the cost
of the HIV response, as reflected in funding requests
submitted to the Global Fund. Although these requests
might contain overestimations, intended to help the
requesting country secure more funding, it is those esti-
mates that are used to justify resource mobilization.
The above analysis indicates that not all alternatives
described in this paper will fit every country. Also, no
one solution will provide for the entire funding needs of
a given HIV response, at least not in the medium and
long term. Solutions should be context specific, factoring
in income and epidemic levels as well as other things.
With no magic bullet to lessen the decline in HIV donor
funding, HIV programs should always first aim to reduce
cost by becoming more efficient and prioritizing ser-
vices, not solely aim at mobilizing additional resources.
If a non-donor funding source is to be explored, coun-
tries should consider not only the expected revenue, but
also the transaction costs, the ability to implement the
mechanism with existing infrastructure, the transparency
of financial flows and accountability and ability to pre-
vent fraud or misuse of funding, social acceptance and
distribution of financial burden, and benefits across sub-
populations within the country.
In the process of mobilizing additional financial re-
sources, there is a need to involve the Ministry of Fi-
nance from the very beginning, as shown in the Kenya
case study. Ministries of Finance are the stewards of the
financial equilibrium of the country and the response to
the epidemic, or the lack of it, will frequently impact this
equilibrium. The strategies presented in this paper
would require Ministry of Finance involvement and sup-
port, both technical and political. This support can be
acquired by developing with them a costed HIV strategy
that will include cost reductions (technical efficiency)
and outcome improvements (allocative efficiency), effi-
ciency measures that will justify the investment in such
strategy. The discussion with the Ministry of Finance
can be supported with evidence on the savings gained
from investments in preventive health care. Managed
care for chronically ill patients yields net economic ben-
efits by reducing future treatment costs in areas such as
hospitalizations, surgeries, and other complications, as is
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hypertensive patients (e.g., Beaulieu et al. [43], Bradbury
[44], and Sidorov et al. [45]). An important article by
Resch et al. [46] argues that public investments in ART
result in net positive economic benefits. The authors es-
timated the cost of maintaining ART during a 10-year
period (2011–2020), for the 3.5 million patients in low-
and middle-income countries worldwide. Next they
estimated the economic savings resulting from such
treatment. The authors concluded that the investment
required for ART, equal in present value to US$14.2
billion, is expected to save 18.5 million life-years and
return US$12–34 billion through increased labor prod-
uctivity, averted orphan care, and deferred medical
treatment for opportunistic infections and end-of-life
care. According to the Global Fund, investing $120 mil-
lion a year on AIDS treatment in Namibia frees
up 9,200 hospital beds for other patients each year
and spares the lives of 1,000 health workers and 550
teachers. During a five-year period, Namibia has seen
AIDS deaths drop from 2,700 annually to 56 [47]. In
addition to the economic return, the Ministry of
Finance needs to recognize that increasing domestic
funding can retain or attract external funding, as in-
creasingly donors require counter-funding, as discussed
above.
The lengthy and complex process of mobilizing non-
donor funding suggests both countries and donors
would benefit from formulating a financial sustainability
plan before any donor funding for HIV programs and
activities is committed, to ensure the funded activities
also continue after the donor funding declines or ends.
The sustainability plan should include specific actions as
to how the recipient country or organization will grad-
ually replace donor funds with domestic and/or internal
financing over a specific timeframe. This timeframe
might vary across countries, by income level and by bur-
den of HIV. In the face of their likely ineligibility for cer-
tain donor funding, it is arguably critical that upper
middle-income countries, especially those with high bur-
den of HIV, undertake immediate measures for replacing
donor funds with domestic resources and other alterna-
tive funds over a relatively shorter timeframe.
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